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Abstract 
This exploratory study examined some of the factors that 
influence approach and landing safety at principal 
international airports, especially as regards the influence 
on risk of fully-functioning precision terminal approach 
and guidance equipment. The objective was to quantify 
the degree to which these factors are associated with the 
risk of an accident. Accident and movement data for 557 
ICAO Principal Airports for decade 1984-1993 were 
evaluated for the risk analysis. The accident sample 
comprised 132 hull loss occurrences. The study 
concludes that precision approaches confer a risk 
advantage of about five over non-precision approaches 
absent other factors on a world-wide basis. The study 
also concludes that, when stratified according to ICAO 
region, the risk increase associated with flying non- 
precision approaches compared with flying precision 
approaches varies from three-fold to nearly eight-fold. 
The lack of Terminal Approach Radar (TAR) increased 
risk among the study population three-fold compared to 
approaches with TAR present. However, this threefold 
increase in risk may potentially be attributed to the risk 
associated with non-precision approaches as in certain 
regions a correlation exists between the presence of 
radar and the presence of precision approach aids. 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ACI Airports Council International 
ADREP Aviation Data Reporting Program (ICAO) 
AFR African Region of ICAO 
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication 
APA Asia-Pacific Region of ICAO 
ARP Aerodrome Reference Point 
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service 
BAS1 Bureau of Air Safety Investigation 
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
EEU Eastern European Region of ICAO 
EUR European Region of ICAO 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FSF Flight Safety Foundation 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
LAM Latin American Region of ICAO 
LOC Localizer 
MID Middle Eastern Region of ICAO 
NAM North American Region of ICAO 
NDB Non-Directional Beacon 
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory 
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NOTAM Notice To Airmen 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
PAP1 Precision Approach Path Indicator 
PAR Precision Approach Radar 
RLD Netherlands Department of Civil Aviation 
RMS Records Management Systems 
RR Risk Ratio 
STAR Standard Instrument Arrival Route 
TAR Terminal Approach Radar 
VAG Visual Approach Guidance 
VASIS Visual Approach Slope Indicator 
VOLMET Meteorology Information for Aircraft in 
Flight 
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Range 
1 Introduction 
Safety data from many studies show that approach and 
landing phase accidents account for a significant 
proportion of fatal air transport accidents. Approxinlately 
50% of the world jet aircraft fleet accidents occurred in 
these flight phases and accounted for 43% of all 
fatalities"'. Not surprisingly one of the Flight Safety 
Foundation's (FSF) current priorities focuses on 
reduction of approach and landing accidents. As the 
majority of accidents occur in the vicinity of airports, 
public awareness is bound to increase. Attention to 
safety on and around airports increased substantially 
following the tragic El Al Airlines B-747 accident near 
Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport in October, 1992. The 
topic of this study is approach and landing safety and its 
interrelationship with airport terminal area guidance 
capabilities. The study was camed out by the FSF, its 
subcontractor, Records Management Systems (RMS) 
Incorporated, and partner National Aerospace Laboratory 
NLR. 
The accident record and literature (e.g. Ref. 1-9) 
suggests, in general, that approach and landing accidents 
do not have a single cause; instead a series of 
contributory factors is nearly always involved. Such 
factors can be related to one or more of the following 
categories, including flight crew, environment, airport, 
ATC, aircraft, air carrier, organizational, and regulatory 
variables. Note that many of these factors are not 
directly controllable by the airport, since they are 
"owned" by another party. For example, the air camers 
have control of the aircraft equipment inventory and its 
condition, as well as the quality and thoroughness of the 
selection, training and supervision of flight crews in 
appropriate procedures. 
Recently there has been much industry debate about the 
risk factors allied to airport safety. Factors such as 
flying into airports surrounded by mountainous terrain, 
lack of radar coverage, absence of visual approach 
guidance, limited runway lighting, and non-precision 
approaches are sometimes associated with an increased 
operational risk"0'. There has been much focus on the 
employment of step down approach paths in the case of 
non-precision approaches. The latter situation may 
inhibit the establishment of a desired stabilized final 
approach. indeed some operators have been constructing 
non-precision approach procedures, where possible, in 
accordance with established stabilized approach criteria 
for many years. Some accidents have also involved pilots 
making errors concerning confusion about which altitude 
to maintain prior to passing a particular fix. Non- 
precision approach procedures with extremely shallow 
descents, as low as one and a half degrees, have also 
been implicated in some occurrences0'. 
This investigation focuses on examining airport and 
approach factors that are postulated to be associated with 
an increased operational risk. As the degree to which 
these factors are associated with the risk of an accident 
has not necessarily been quantified elsewhere, this theme 
is central to the current study. 
1.1 Study Objectives 
The central research question of this exploratory study 
was to quantify the relative risks of approach and landing 
operations with or without precision guidance at typical 
international Principal Airports. An additional task, 
dependent on the quality of the available data, was to 
quantify the degree of association for some of the other 
factors that may influence the risk of an approach and 
landing accident. A more comprehensive account of the 
study is presented in Ref. 11. 
2 Risk Ratio Estimation 
It is not sufficient to conclude from accident data alone 
that if a certain factor occurs in a significant fraction of 
the accident sample that it must be an important element 
of the events leading to the accidents. The equivalent 
fraction for all non-accident flights should be determined 
to enable assessment of the significance of the fraction 
found in the accident sample. Ideally, the available data 
would enable a full comparison between the accident 
data and the movement data. This involves establishing, 
in both accident and non-accident flights, the occurrences 
of all the factors of interest. 
An estimate of the risk of crashing with a particular 
factor present was accomplished through the 
development of a risk ratio (RR). This risk ratio is 
represented by the following expression 
where 
a = numbers of occurrences of a factor in 
accidents 
A = total number of accidents 
f = number of occurrences of the factor in 
non-accident flights 
N = total number of movements. 
The risk ratio magnitude provides some insight on the 
relative associatio/r (NB not causation) of a particular 
factor on the risk of an accident. A risk ratio of 1 means 
there is no significant difference in risk with the risk 
factor present and with it absent. A value greater than 
one indicates a greater risk. The larger the value of the 
RR, the stronger the association between the risk factor 
and the accident risk. The value itself indicates the 
magnitude of that risk. These relationships can then be 
tested for statistical significance and 95% confidence 
intervals calculated for the risk estimates. The 95% 
confidence interval provides insight on what the range of 
that risk might be as the RR is not absolute since its 
estimation is based on a sample. If the 95% confidence 
interval does not include'the value of one, then the risk 
ratio is deemed to be statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. The statistical test conducted for the bivariate 
analyses was based on the Chi square test for 2x2 tables. 
I1 should be nofed lhal a posilive association belween a 
risk facfor and approach accidents does not prove 
causalion. It means only fhal a demonslmled 
associalion exisls. 
The calculation of the risk ratio could only be 
accomplished for those variables where data existed for 
the prevalence of the factor among all airports included 
in the study sample. Initially, this evaluation strived to 
include factors other than approach variables in 
recognition of the multiple factor paradigm of accident 
causation. Denominator information {fIN) for factors 
such as pilot experience, pilot to pilot communication, 
etc. is not readily available for the entire commercial 
aircraft fleet. Therefore, the data gathering focused on 
airport and approach data such as approach type 
(precision and non-precision), approach lighting, 
surrounding terrain, approach radar services, standard 
arrival procedures (STARS) and visual approach path 
guidance (VASISIPAPI). 
3 Methodology 
The overall approach employed in this study was to: 
(a) identify a sample of approach and landing accidents 
using world-wide sources; 
(b) identify potential approach and landing accident 
factors using accident narratives and related 
literature; 
(c) compile airport movement and necessary non- 
accident data demanded by the risk ratio 
evaluation; and 
(d) analyze the information gathered from these tasks 
in the context of the central research question. This 
involved risk ratio estimation. 
The following sections provide additional detail of the 
methodology used. 
@) The accidents occurred during the period 1984 
through 1993. 
(c) The accident resulted in loss of the aircraft hull. 
(d) The accidents involved fixed wing aircraft; 
turbojet, turboprop and piston engined aircraft; and 
aircraft in all weight categories. 
(e) The accident flights had the following 
characteristics 
engaged in public transport 
world-wide - no geographical restriction 
freight, passenger and positioning flights 
scheduled and non-scheduled flights 
international and domestic flights. 
Excluded were training flights, experimentalltest 
flights, aerial applicationlsurvey flights and 
construction work flights 
( f )  Accidents due to sabotage, terrorism and military 
actions were excluded. 
3.1 Aceideflt Data Sources After application of these criteria, the final accident 
sample consists of 132 accidents, see Appendix A. 
Searches were conducted on the following 
databaseslsources for accident data: 3.3 Airport Data 
Airclaims 
Allied Signal (formerly Sundstrand) CFIT database(4J 
Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) 
* U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)"" 
a Flight International"" 
FSFIICAO CFIT Task Force database 
* Fokker Aircraft 
ICAO ADREP database 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory"' 
NLR accident database 
U. S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
Netherlands Aviation Safety Board 
Robert E. Breiling Associates, I ~ C . ( ~ ' * ' ~  
Skandia International. 
These sources provided sufficient data to enable 
compilation of a virtually complete listing of all reported 
accidents that fulfil the qualification criteria presented in 
Section 3.2. With the exception of a few U.S. and 
European complete accident reports, accident 
summarieslnarratives provided by the referenced sources 
above were generally employed to compile specific data 
on each of these accidents. 
3.2 Accident Sample and Inclusion Criteria 
Several criteria were used to establish the accident 
sample analyzed in this investigation, namely 
(a) the accidents occurred during initial and final 
approach, landing, flare, roll-out after touchdown, 
and go-around on a Principal Airport defined in 
Section 3.3.1. 
A sample group of airports for which accident; airport 
specific, and movement data could be collected was 
required. Details are given below. 
3.3.1 Principal Airports 
The airport sample employed consists of the world's 
most important international airports, and is based 
primarily on IC40 Principal International Airpons. The 
sample was augmented to include major U.S. and 
European airports not fully meeting the ICAO inclusion 
criteria. The final Pritrcipal Airpons sample consists of 
557 airports, see Ref. 11 for full details. 
Movement data (i.e. number of take-offs and landings) 
for the principal airports were collected from ICAO, 
Airports Council International (ACI) and the FAA. 
Missing data entries were supplemented by interpolation 
and extrapolation techniques(In. 
3.3.2 Airport Specific Data 
Data sources were principally the Jeppesen Airways 
Manual, national Aeronautical Information Publications 
(AIP) and navigational documentation published by some 
major airlines. 
The data is considered biased in the sense that it 
represents a July 1995 snapshot of available resources at 
the principal airports and it is assumed that this 
adequately describes the situation throughout the 1984-93 
time span. This assumption seems plausible when the 
time and investments required to significantly upgrade 
airport facilities is considered. 
Note also that possible unse~iceahility of technical 
facilities in the 1984-1993 time frame is not accounted 
for in the data. On an average day it was verified by 
checking NOTAMs for the principal airports that less 
than two percent of the approaches were compromised 
by the unserviceability of approach aids. It is assumed 
that any variations would not significantly influence the 
conclusions of the study. 
3.3.3 Airport and Runway Variables 
In this study ILS, MLS and PAR are considered 
precision approaches, whereas approaches with lateral 
guidance from LOC, VOR, NDB or  GPS are considered 
non-precision. 
Airport variables describe the airport as a whole and 
hold true for all runway-ends at that particular airport, 
whereas runway variables describe the (approach to the) 
individual runway-end. 
Airport data collected were: 
(a) The presence of significant terrain features in the 
vicinity of the airfield. Significant terrain in this 
context is defined as any spot elevation or obstacle 
more than 2000 feet above the aerodrome reference 
point (ARP) elevation within a circle of 6 NM 
around the ARP or  6000 feet within a circle of 25 
NM around the ARP. A similar definition is also 
used by Jeppesen to determine whether or not to 
include colored contours on its approach plates"". 
@) The availability of the latest weather observations 
to the pilot via ATIS or  VOLMET. 
(c) The presence of Terminal Approach Radar (TAR). 
(d) The presence of published amval routes from the 
airways to the final approach fixes of the 
instrument approaches at the airfield. 
(e) Number of movements per annum, averaged over 
the 1984-1993 time frame. 
For every runway-end, data collected were: 
(f) The presence of an approach lighting system. 
(g) The presence of any visual glidepath indicating 
system like PAP1 or VASIS. 
(h) The most precise published instrument approach 
procedure to the runway-end. 
(i) The absolute number of landings on the runway- 
end. This is derived from the number of 
movements to the airfield, distributed over the 
runway-ends at that airfield where actual 
operational experience, prevailing winds, published 
preferential runway usage and runway-end 
approach facilities were used to determine this 
distribution. 
4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the accidents rates 
among the major ICAO regions. The average rate was 
slightly more than 10 accidents per million movements. 
The highest rates were for Latin America (LAM) and 
(AFR). North America (NAM) and Europe (EUR) had 
lowest accident rates. 
Table 1 Accident Distribution by ICAO Region 
ACCIDENTS11 
ICAO MILLION 
REGION No. MOVEMENTS 
AFR 17 30.21 
APA 19 18.28 
EEU 5 20.55 
EUR 26 9.51 
LAM 34 32.36 
MID 3 11.40 
NAM 28 4.08 
TOTAL 132 10.35 
Table 2 Type of Approach Flown 
TYPE 
APPROACH No. % 
Non-Precision 27 20.5 
Precision 35 26.5 
Unknown 57 43.2 
Visual 13 9.8 
Table 2 displays the distribution of the type of approach 
flown for the accident sample. The data was unknown in 
43 % of the cases. Among those where approach status is 
known the distribution of precision and non-precision is 
quite similar. 
Table 3 displays the distribution of the presence or 
absence of airport related factors deemed to be 
potentially important in these approach accidents. 
Approach lights were present for at least 58 (44%) of the 
accidents, while 61 of the accidents (46%) occurred 
while approaching runways with visual approach 
guidance systems in place. It should be noted that the 
presence of approach lights could not be determined for almost four fold that if current airport weather 
51 of the accidents (39%). and the presence of information is available. When interpreting the latter 
VASIPAPI could not be determined for 39 of the finding it should be considered that correlations may 
accidents (30%). This limitation should be considered exist with other factors. The presence of high terrain, the 
when interpreting these results. lack of VASIS or PAPI, and the lack of approach lights 
were not associated with a greater risk of crashing within 
Table 3 Airport Related Factors this population. 
Airport-Related % % % 
Factors YES NO UKN 
Approach Lights 43.9 17.4 38.6 
STAR 73.5 25.8 0.8 
Approach Radar 67.4 31.8 0.8 
High Terrain 28.0 71.2 0.8 
ATISIVOLMET 81.4 21.2 0.8 
4.2 Bivariate Analysis 
Table 4 presents the findings from the evaluation of the 
association of airport related risk factors and approach 
accidents adjusted for the number of movements 
involving that particular risk factor. Recall from Section 
2 that a RR larger rhan one irrdicares a grearer acciderlt 
risk wirh rhe facror under coruiderarion preserlr. 
However, the lower limir of rhe 95% con~der~ce irlrerval 
must be greater than one for rhe risk ro be considered 
staristically sign$carlr. The movement ratio (number of 
non-risk movements divided by risk factor movements) 
provides some insight to the ratio of movements with the 
risk factor present compared to those without the risk 
factor present. A high value denotes a large difference 
while a lower value denotes that the number of 
movements with the risk factor present and not present 
are more similar. 
It should be recognized that the results presented below 
treat the TAR, approach stalus, and ATISlVOLMET 
variables as independent factors. It is likely, however, 
that these factors are closely related and not independent 
since many large airports provide all these services. The 
I 
reader should keep these limitations in mind when 
I reviewing the results. 
I 
Table 4 shows that the risk of crashing while flying a 
non-precision approach is five times greater than that 
associated with flying a precision approach. If TAR is 
not available, the associated risk of crashing is three 
times greater than that when it is present. If there is no 
standardized approach routing, the risk is about one and 
a half times that when STARS are available. If there is 
no ATIS or VOLMET, the associated risk of crashing is 
Table 5 looks at the risk associated with non-precision 
approaches stratified by each ICAO region. All the 
regions had a greater positive association between non- 
precision approaches and the risk of crashing while on 
approach than for aircraft flying precision approaches - 
ranging from a threefold increase in risk to almost an 
eightfold increase of risk depending on the region. Note 
also the movement ratio which gives some indication of 
the relative frequency of non-precision approaches 
compared to precision approaches. Europe (EUR) had 
the highest movement ratio of 16.6 while Latin America 
(LAM) had the lowest with a value of 3.2. 
Table 6 shows the percentage of ILS approaches made 
with the assistance of approach radar, stratified by 
region. From Table 6 it can be concluded that in the 
North America (NAM) region, virtually no ILS approach 
is made without the presence of a TAR. The Africa 
(AFR) and LAM regions show that a significant number 
of airports offer a precision approach facility but do not 
have a TAR. In developed regions of the world (Europe 
and North America) an ILS installation in most cases is 
associated with a TAR. 
Table 7 provides the risk ratio of the association behveen 
TAR and accidents. Europe and Asia-Pacific (APA) 
show a statistically significant no TAR risk ratio of 
three. As noted above in these latter regions, the 
presence of a TAR is often combined with the presence 
of an ILS (Table 6) while in the regions with low 
correlation between ILS and TAR, namely Africa and 
Latin America, the TAR risk ratio is considerably lower. 
It seems likely that the risk ratio for no TAR is 
correlated to some exten! with the risk ratio associated 
with a non-precision approach. 
Both AFR and LAM have no demonstrated increase of 
risk when TAR is not present. It is interesting to note 
that both of these regions have TAR movement ratios 
which indicate an equal number of TAR and none TAR 
movements during the study period. 
It is also interesting to note that the North America 
region has a very high TAR movement ratio of 44 which 
indicates that vast majority of approaches in the NAM 
region are flown with TAR guidance. 
Table 4 Risk Ratio for Airport Related Risk Factors, All ICAO Regions 
Airport- 95 % Risk Non Risk Risk Non Risk Move- 
Related Confidence Factor Factor Factor Factor ment 
Risk Factor Risk Ratio Intervals Accidents Accidents Movement Movement Ratio 
- 
Non Precision 
Approach 5.2 3.9CRRC6.9 27 35 1,037,947 11,403,061 11 
No Term. 
Appr. Radar 3.1 2.4CRRC4.0 42 89 1,322,944 11,429,765 8.6 
High Terrain 1.2* 0.9<RR<1.6 37 94 2,852,450 9,588,652 3.4 
No STAR 1.6 1.2cRRc2.1 34 97 2,122,025 10,630,685 5.0 
No ATISl 
VOLMET 3.9 2.8CRRC5.5 28 103 693,875 12,058,835 17.4 
No Approach 
Lights 1.4 1.O<RR<2.0 23 58 2,559,278 10,191,932 4.0 
Nos: * denotes that the risk ratio value war not statislicslly signitisant at ihc 5% Icvcl. 
Table 5 Risk Ratio for Non Precision Approaches Stratified by ICAO Region 
Non 95 % Non- Non- Move- 
ICAO Precision Confidence Precision Precision Precision Precision ment 
Region Risk Ratio Intervals Accidents Accidents Movements Movement Ratio 
All Regions 
Combined 
AFR 
EEU 
APA 
EUR 
MID 
LAM 
NAM 
5.2 
3.6 
nla 
7.7 
4.1 
nla 
3 
5.8 
3.9<RR<6.9 
2.1 C RRC41.7 
nla 
4.5CRRC13.1 
1.8CRR<9.8 
nla 
2.OCRRC4.4 
3.OCRRC11.0 
Note: Risk ratio valuer for EEU and MID regions were no1 insludcd in this listing sinss lhcy did no1 havc any non.prceisian accidents that wsrc 
identified in  this study. Thsy wsrs included in the aggreplc calcvlotion for all regions. 
Nolc: Risk ratio valuer for EEU.MID and NAM region. were no1 included in this lirling rincc they did no1 have any non-TAR n d a r  that wen 
idcntifisd in this study. They were included in the aggregate cslculntian for all regions. 
denotes that the risk rado value war not natinically significant at the 5% level. 
Table 6 Percentage of ILS approaches conducted wtth TAR assistance 
Table 8 Risk Ratio of High Terrain Around Accident Airport,, Stratified by ICAO Region 
I REGION 
High 95 % High High Move- 
ICAO Terrain Confidence Terrain No Terrain Terrain No Terrain ment 
Region Risk Ratio Intervals Accidents Accidents Movements Movement Ratio 
All Regions 1.2* 0.9<RRC 1.6 37 94 2,852,450 9,588,652 3.4 
Combined 
EUR EEU NAM AFR MID LAM APA Total 
AFR 0.4* 0.1CRRC1.5 2 15 165,570 397,164 2.4 
EEU nla nla 1 4 21,050 222,250 10.6 
I 
APA 1.0* 0.6<RR< 1.9 7 12 367,300 672,080 1.8 
EUR 0.9* 0.4CRRC2.1 5 20 581.300 2,151,480 3.7 
MID nla nla 1 2 58,650 204,533 3.5 
i % 
1 LAM 0.8* 0.5<RR< 1.3 10 23 415,500 635,132 1.5 
82% 91% 97% 36% 78% 53% 82% 82% 
I 
; Table 7 Risk Ratio for Terminal Approach Radar Stratified by ICAO Region 
I 95 % TAR TAR Move- 
ICAO No TAR Confidence No TAR Present No TAR Present ment 
Region Risk Ratio Intervals Accidents Accidents Movements Movement Ratio 
All Regions 3.1 2.4<RRC4.0 42 89 1,322,944 11,429,765 8.6 
Combined 
AFR 1.2* 0.8<RR<1.7 11 6 298,844 263,890 1.1 
EEU nla nla 0 5 28,100 215,200 7.6 
APA 3.0 1.7CRRc5.5 7 12 126,400 912,980 7.2 
EUR 3.5 1.4<RR<8.5 4 21 144,700 2,988,080 17.9 
MID 1.3* 0.3<RR<6.5 1 2 66,400 196,783 3.0 
LAM 1.2* 0.9<RR<1.6 19 14 505,680 544.982 1.1 
NAM nla nla nla 28 152.850 6,707,850 43.9 
~." 
,. 
Note: Risk ratio valuer for EEU,snd MID rcgions wcrc no1 included in this lirling since thc number of accidents in onc or more categories was Iw 
small to calsulatc. They were included in ihs sggccgnlc cnlculnlian for all regions. 
denotes that the risk ratio value was not nntinically significsa a1 thc 5% Iavcl. 
Presence of high terrain around an airport did not appear 
to have a significant impact on risk of crashing 
compared to airports without high terrain (Table 8). The 
finding that high terrain is not a risk factor for aircraft 
approaching airports does not mean it is not an important 
consideration. It just means that no association between 
high terrain and increased risk of an accident was 
shown, based on the data available for this study. 
Table 9 lists the risk ratios associated with the absence 
of STARS at airports where the approach accidents 
occurred. Only the AFR and NAM regions had risk 
ratios that were statistically significantly greater than 1 
for the absence of STARS. 
Table 10 displays the results of the evaluation of the 
association of visual approach guidance (VAG) and risk 
of an accident stratified by ICAO region. There were no 
significant increases in risk associated with an absence of 
VAG. These results should not be interpreted to mean 
that VAG is not needed. It means that in this study, no 
demonstrated association was shown between accident 
risk and the presence or absence of VAG. The lack of 
association may be due to the fact that most of these 
accident aircraft were conducting instrument approaches. 
The main value of VAG may be for aircraft that are 
conducting visual approaches. Other correlations may 
exist, for example if stratified across approach type. 
4.3 Data and Study Limitations 
This study is subject to limitations that need to be 
considered when interpreting the results. While some 
have already been addressed, it is important to 
summarise the main points. 
(a) Limited Sample Size - While the 132 accidents 
analyzed represent the majority of commercial 
aircraft accidents that occurred on approach and 
landing on Principal Airports during the period 
under consideration, the small number of events 
limited the analysis to very simple single- and two- 
factor analysis. 
@) Missing Data - Many accidents had factors that 
were coded as unknown since the,details were not 
available in the summary report. Missing data not 
only escalated problem (a) above, hut may 
represent a serious problem since its influence on 
the results of the study is unknown. However, this 
study was exploratory in nature. 
(c) Accident Analysis - An effort was made to assess 
the influence of factors other than type of approach 
on accident risk in recognition of the multiple 
factor paradigm of accident causation. This 
evaluation, however, was limited by both the 
limited size of the accident sample and the paucity 
of data for some more important factors that past 
experience show are significant in accident 
causation. 
5 Conclusions 
For the accident sample analyzed herein, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
(a) Latin America and Africa ICAO regions 
demonstrated the highest approach and landing 
accident rates, followed by Eastern Europe. 
Western Europe and North America had the lowest 
rates, the rate for North America being 7 times 
lower than that in Latin America. 
@) On a world-wide basis, there appears to be a five- 
fold increase in accident risk among commercial 
aircraft flying non-precision approaches compared 
with those flying precision approaches. 
(c) When stratified by ICAO region, the risk increase 
associated with flying non-precision approaches 
compared with those flying precision approaches 
ranges from three-fold to almost eight-fold, 
depending on the region. 
(d) The lack of TAR increased risk among the study 
population three-fold compared to approaches with 
TAR present. To some extent this threefold 
increase in risk may be attributed to the risk 
associated with non-precision approaches as in 
ceriain regions a cornladon exists between the 
presence of radar and the presence of precision 
approach aids. 
(e) World-wide, presence of high terrain around an 
airport did not appear to have a significant 
influence on accident risk compared to airports 
without terrain. This implies that terrain is not 
necessarily a prerequisite for the approach accidents 
to occur: however. this does not mean that high 
terrain is not an important consideration for aircraft 
approaching high terrain airports. 
(0 Absence of charted procedures for initial arrival to 
an airport area in the ICAO North American and 
African regions showed a 1.5 increase in risk of an 
accident, compared to airports that bad STARS. 
(g) Though visual approach guidance is deemed an 
important landing aid, no association was 
demonstrated between the presence or absence of 
VAG and accident risk for the accident sample 
considered herein. 
6 Recommendations 
Based on this study, the following recommendations are 
considered appropriate, namely 
(a) the risk value of 3ying precision approaches vs 
non-precision approaches should be conveyed to all 
operators and airport authorities. 
Table 9 Risk Ratio of Absence of STARS, Stratified by ICAO Region 
95 % NO STAR STAR STAR Move- 
ICAO STAR Confidence Present Present No STAR Present ment 
Region Risk Ratio Intervals Accidents Accidents Movements Movement Ratio 
All Regions 
Combined 1.6 1.2CRRC2.1 34 97 2,122,025 10,630,685 5.0 
AFR 1.6 l.lCRR<2.3 11 6 224,775 337,959 1.5 
EEU nla nla 0 5 20,950 222,350 10.6 
APA 1.8* 0.5<RR<6.8 2 17 60,050 979,330 16.3 
EUR 1.8* 0.3CRRC4.5 2 23 184,700 2,548,080 13.8 
MID nla nla 0 3 110,600 152,583 1.4 
LAM 0.9* 0.5<RRC 1.5 10 23 361,400 689,232 1.9 
NAM 1.9 l.lCRRC3.3 9 19 1,159,550 5,701,150 4.9 
Note: Risk ratio values for EEU,and MID regions were not included i n  lhir listing rinse the number of accidcna in onc or more categories war too 
s m l l  to calculate. 7hcy we= included in  the aggregate calculation far sll regions. 
* denotes that the risk mPo value was not statistically rignilicant at lhc 5 %  Icvcl. 
' Table 10 Risk Ratio of Absence of VASI or PAPI, Stratified by ICAO Region 
95 96 NO VASI VASI VASI Move- 
ICAO VASI Confidence Present Present No VASI Present ment 
Region Risk Ratio Intervals Accidents Accidents Movements Movement Ratio 
All Regions 
Combined 0.8* 0.6CRRC 1.1 32 61 5,294,677 7,458,033 1.4 
AFR 1.5* 0.6<RR<3.7 3 6 125,954 436,780 3.5 
EEU nla nla 3 0 125,919 117.381 0.9 
APA 1.0* 0.2<RR<6.9 1 12 75,906 963,473 12.7 
EUR 1.6* 0.9CRRC2.7 8 13 660,190 2,072,589 3.1 
MID nla n/a 0 3 26,371 236,811 9.0 
LAM 1.3' 0.6CRRC2.7 5 17 189,273 861,359 4.6 
I NAM 0.9* 0.6CRRC 1.3 12 10 4,091.062 2,769,637 0.7 
Noa: Risk ratio values for EEU,snd M I D  regions were not insludcd in  lhir listing rinse lhe number of accidcna in one or more catcgorics war loo I s m l  m N luhu .  They r m  included in th* aggmgatc mkukt ion for all regions. 1 * denotes lhat lhc risk ratio value was not rmlimically r ign i f i~ad at h e  5 %  lovel. 
New technologies for  providing approach and 
landing guidance (e.g. GPS) should b e  reviewed 
periodically b y  authorities and air  carriers to equip 
airfjelds with precision guidance capability where 
present ground-based equipment i s  too costly or 
ineffective, due to siting andlor terrain problems. 
International support should b e  given to reducing 
the approach and landing risk variances behveen 
different ICAO Regions. 
T h e  international sharing of  accident and incident 
data should h e  encouraged, to facilitate addressing 
safety problems quickly and effectively. 
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Appendix A Accident S a m p l e  Listing 
DATE 
03/13/84 
04/26/84 
06/16/84 
08/05/84 
09/18/84 
10/17/84 
10/22/84 
11110184 
12/20/84 
12/30/84 
01101185 
01/09/85 
02/07/85 
02/19/85 
0411 1/85 
04/15/85 
08/02/85 
12/02/85 
01/27/86 
01/31/86 
02/07/86 
02/21/86 
03/20/86 
06/10/86 
08/31/86 
09/14/86 
AIRPORT AIRCRAFT TYPE 
Erncsto Cortissoz, Colombia C-46 
Brcmcn. Germany 8-727 
Sanaa INTL, Ycmcn IL-18 
Zia UI Hak, Bangladesh F-27 
Schwechat. Austria Metro 
Arlanda. Sweden Metro 
Kennedy INTL. Bolivia CV-440 
King. Virgin Islands Lcar 24 
Dar es Salaam INTL, Tanzania DHC-6 
Bali INTL, lndoncsia DC-9 
Kenncdy INTL. Bolivia 0-727 
Kansas City Downtown, USA L-188 
LC Bourget. France CL-600 
Bilbao. Spain 8-727 
Salta. Argcnlina HS-125 
Phukct INTL. Thailand B-737 
Dallas Fort Worth INTL. USA, TX L-1011 
Rio dc Jnnciro Galcao. Brazil 8-747 
Ezeiza INTL, Argentina 8-707 
Enst Midlands. UK SD-360 
King Abdul Aziz INTL, Saudi Arabia 8-737 
Eric INTL, USA, PA DC-9 
Sam Ratulangi, Indonesia CASA-212 
Cairo INTL, Egypt F-27 
Lor Angclcs INTL, USA, CA DC-9 
Schiphol, Ncthcrlands Islander 
Sam Ratulangi, lndonesia 
Maputo INTL, Mozambique 
Charlotte Douglas INTL, USA, NC 
Mohamcd V, Morocco 
Port Bouet, Ivory Coast 
Salt Lake City INTL, USA. UT 
Wayne County MET. USA, MI 
Kansas City Downtown, USA, MO 
Kansas City INTL, USA, MO 
Kennedy INTL. Bolivia 
Eugcnio Mar de Hostos, Puerto Rico 
Viru Vim INTL, Bolivia 
La Aurora INTL. Guatcmala 
Phuket INTL, Thailand 
La P a h a ,  Canary Islands, Spain 
Mcmphis INTL, USA, TN 
Lccds Bradford. UK 
Mcrignac. Francc 
Adnan Mcndcrcs. Turkcy 
William P. Hobby, USA, TX 
La Plata County. USA. CO 
Hannovcr, Gcrmany 
4th of February, Angola 
Orly. France 
Kansas City Downtown, USA, MO 
Tacoma INTL, USA. WA 
Hannovcr, Gcrmany 
Sockamo Hatta INTL, Indonesia 
Emcsto Cortissoz. Colombia 
Murtala Muhnmmcd, Nigcria 
Reykjavik, Iceland 
Hong Kong INTL, Hong Kong 
Bangkok INTL, Thailand 
Wclschap, Nethcrlandr 
Fiumicino, Italy 
East Midlands. UK 
Lisbon. Portugal 
Kuala Lumpur INTL, Malaysia 
Helsinki-Vantaa. Finland 
Toncontin INTL, Honduras 
Ataturk. Turkey 
Guarulhos INTL, Brazil 
Coroncl Fransisco Secada V. Peru 
Chabcuil, Francc 
Johan Adolf Pengel, Surinam 
Bole. EIhiopia 
Sioux Gatcway, USA, IA 
Ninoy Aquino INTL, Philippines 
Tripoli INTL. Lybia 
Coronel Fransisco Sccada V, Pcru 
William P. Hobby, USA, TX 
Port Harcourt. Nigeria 
Toncontin INTL, Honduras 
Tri-Cities, USA. WA 
J.F. Kcnncdy INTL, USA, NY 
Toncontin INTL. Honduras 
Kabul. Afghanistan 
Ncw Hanovcr INTL, USA. NC 
Cairns INTL, Australia 
Khartoum, Sudan 
Cozumcl INTL, Mcxico 
Logan INTL, USA. MA 
Metro 
CASA-212 
PA-32 
8-707 
DC-6 
CASA-212 
DHCd 
Lcar 23 
8-737 
Falcon 20 
Bwch 18 
King Air 
EMB-120 
8-737 
HS-125 
Mctm 
Mctm 
8-707 
F-27 
B m h  18 
DHC-8 
F-27 
Viscount 
CL-44 
8-707 
CASA-312 
Trident 
TU-134 
MU-2B 
8-707 
B-737 
Lenr 23 
8-747 
Metro 
DC-6 
Mctm 
8-707 
8-737 
F-27 
DC-8 
B-707 
DC-10 
BAC 1-11 
DC-10 
DC-8 
HS-125 
BAC 1-11 
8-727 
JclStrcam 
8-707 
L-188 
IL-76 
Nomad 
Citat-l 
B-707 
Jct-Comd 
PAJLT 
Zurich, Switzerland DC-9 
Des Moincs INTL, USA, IA PA-31T 
Jomo Kcnyatta INTL, Kenya B-707 
Tancredo Neves, Brazil Lcar 25 
Los Angela INTL, USA, CA B-737 
City of Colorado Springs M, USA, 8-737 
Eduard G o m a  INTL, Brazil Lcar 35 
Brasilia INTL, Brazil Lcar 25 
Sam Ratulangi. Indonesia F-27 
Pulkovo, Russia TU-154 
Oscar Machado Zuloaga INTL, Vcnczuela G-I1 
King Abdul Aziz INTL, Saudi Arabia DC-8 
Guslavo Rojas 'pinilla. Colombia AC-690 
Kota Kmabalu, Malaysia '2-11 
Lic Bcnito Juarcz INTL. Mexico TU-154 
Emcsto Cortissoz, Colombia Hcrald 
Okecic, Poland DC-9 
Entzhcim AB, France A-320 
Mallam Aminu. Nigeria DC-8 
Athens, Grccec B-707 
Granada, Spain DC-9 
Eugcnio Mar d e  Hostos. Pucrto Rico CASA-212 
Cruzeiro do Sul INTL. Brazil 8-737 
Lic Bcnito Juarcz INTL. Mexico Viscount 
Tribhuvan INTL, Ncpal A-310 
Tribhuvan INTL, Ncpal A-300 
Schiphol. Ncthcrlands B-747 
Sky Harbor INTL, USA, AZ Sabrcjcl 
Pucrto Plata INTL, Dominican Republic IL18 
Mallam Aminu. Nigeria B-707 
Mariscal Sucre INTL, Ecuador Sabrcjct 
Faro, Ponugal DC-10 
Charlcs dc  Ga~llc .  France DHC-8 
Indira Gnndhi INTL. India TU-154 
Port BOUC~. Ivory Coast 8-707 
Rio de Jenciro Galcao INTL, Brazil Lcar 31 
Natrona County INTL, USA, WY MU-2B 
Dallas Fort Worth INTL, USA, TX DC-10 
Augusto Cesar Sandino, Nicaragua B-737 
Bush. USA, GA King Air 
Okecic, Poland A-320 
Hong Kong INTL, Hong Kong B-747 
Yoff, Sencgal DHC-6 
Kansas City Downtown, USA, MO L-188 
